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Theory of mind (ToM), the ability to think about the perspectives, beliefs, and feelings of
another, develops throughout childhood and adolescence and is an important skill for
social interactions. This study examines neural activity in typically developing children
during a novel ToM task – the Movie Mentalizing Task– and tests its relations to ToM
behavioral performance and social functioning. In this fMRI task, children ages 8–13 years
(N = 25) watched a brief movie clip and were asked to predict a character’s mental state
after a social interaction. Engaging in the Movie Mentalizing Task activated the ToM neural
network. Moreover, greater neural activity in the ToM network, including the superior
temporal gyrus and inferior frontal gyrus, was associated with better behavioral performance
on independent ToM tasks and was related to better social functioning, though these
results do not survive correction for multiple comparisons. Results offer a new affective
theory of mind task for children in the scanner that robustly recruits activity in theory of
mind regions.
Keywords: social cognition, social behavior, developmental psychology, developmental cognitive neuroscience,
theory of mind

INTRODUCTION
Theory of mind – the ability to reason about others’ mental states – is critical for effective
social interaction and communication. Social-cognitive abilities like theory of mind (ToM) in
childhood are associated with typically developing children’s adaptive social behavior (Caputi
et al., 2012; Fink et al., 2015b; Devine et al., 2016). Deficits in social-cognitive ability are
associated with negative outcomes including peer rejection and bullying in typically developing
children (Banerjee et al., 2011; Shakoor et al., 2012). Understanding the neurobiological
mechanisms that support these processes may offer important insight into typical and atypical
patterns of social functioning among children. Only a handful of studies (e.g., Richardson
et al., 2018; Mukerji et al., 2019) have bridged the gap between the neurobiology supporting
ToM processing and social functioning in children. The following study addresses this gap in
the literature by investigating the neural basis of ToM in typically developing school-aged
1
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children and the relationship among ToM-related neural activity,
ToM behavioral performance, and broader aspects of social
functioning. We examined these brain-behavior relationships
using a novel fMRI theory of mind task specifically designed
for neuroimaging studies with children.
There is a developmental progression of ToM abilities
throughout early childhood into adolescence. Early in
development, research suggests that infants and toddlers can
make connections between physical cues, such as gaze or facial
expressions to behaviors related to perception or emotions
(Phillips et al., 2002; Saxe et al., 2004). Typically developing
children, by ages 4 and 5, are then able to use that mental
representation to reason and make predictions about a person’s
beliefs, goals, desires, emotions, and motivations (Saxe et al.,
2004). Language plays a particularly important role in this
shift at ages 4 and 5. Developmentally, there is a specific shift
in more complex theory of mind tasks between the ages of
3–5 years; most 3-year-old children will fail a false belief task,
that 5-year-old children can successfully complete (Wellman
et al., 2001). However, there is some research to suggest that
this developmental change may be linked to the development
of general cognitive processing abilities (including language
and executive functioning) that allow children to explicitly
reason about false beliefs, rather than a developmental transition
specific to social-cognitive abilities, as some literature suggests
that infants and toddlers may be able to understand false
belief (Baillargeon et al., 2010; Scott and Baillargeon, 2017).
Additionally, though children demonstrate a mastery of many
types of ToM skills [e.g., false belief reasoning (Miller, 2009)]
by elementary school age, research suggests that ToM continues
to improve in middle childhood (Devine and Hughes, 2013)
and that use of theory of mind increases from early to late
adolescence (Dumontheil et al., 2010), a finding congruent
with neuroimaging studies showing continued maturation of
brain regions involved in ToM processing (Blakemore, 2008;
Vetter et al., 2014; Bowman et al., 2019).
Research with adults has identified a network of regions,
including the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), anterior cingulate
cortex, precuneus, right superior temporal sulcus, bilateral
temporal poles, bilateral temporoparietal junction (TPJ), and
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), which support theory of mind
processing (Schurz et al., 2014; Molenberghs et al., 2016).
Though previous work has shown that during ToM tasks
typically developing children recruit these same regions that
have been identified in adults (Kobayashi et al., 2007; Saxe
et al., 2009), there remain important developmental changes
in these ToM regions. Specifically, studies suggest that there
is an increased functional specialization of ToM regions between
the ages of 3–12 years in typically developing children (Gweon
et al., 2012; Richardson et al., 2018).
Several research studies have shown that individual differences
in children’s ToM ability, as measured on behavioral tasks, are
related to differences in social functioning. Research shows
that in typically developing children and deaf children ages
5–13, ToM ability was found to be a more reliable predictor
of overall social skills than gender, age, or language proficiencies
(Peterson et al., 2016). Caputi et al. (2012) found that ToM
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

was positively related to teachers’ ratings of typically developing
children’s prosocial behavior over multiple time points.
Furthermore, ToM is especially salient within friendship
formation and interpersonal relationships in typically developing
children (Banerjee et al., 2011; Devine and Hughes, 2013; Fink
et al., 2015a,b). A potential rationale for such outcomes lies
within ToM development such that a more accurate understanding
of another’s mental state could facilitate more harmonious
relations via increased communication, cooperation, and general
rapport (Peterson et al., 2015).
To date, research has identified a network of regions reliably
active during ToM tasks and, presumably, responsible for
thinking about the mental states of others (e.g., Gweon et al.,
2012). Additionally, studies have found that behavioral measures
of ToM are related to real-world social functioning (e.g., Peterson
et al., 2016). What remains less well understood is the brainbehavior connection, linking ToM-related neural activity, ToM
or social-cognitive ability, and social functioning, particularly
in school-aged children. Understanding the relationship between
the neurobiology of social-cognitive processes like ToM and
social functioning could provide important insight into typical
social development and atypical social development, such as
the ToM processing deficits seen in individuals with autism
spectrum disorders (Kennedy and Adolphs, 2012). The following
study addresses this gap in the literature, investigating the
relationship among neural activity in a novel ToM task, behavioral
measures of ToM, and social functioning.
In this study, we use a novel ToM task: the Movie Mentalizing
Task. In contrast to a false belief task, which is a cognitive
theory of mind task, the Movie Mentalizing Task is an affective,
or emotion inferencing, task. ToM tasks, such as the false
belief paradigm, have come under scrutiny regarding the
general/non-ToM cognitive demands (e.g., attentional, linguistic,
executive control) that may better account for differences in
performance on this task (Bloom and German, 2000; Perner
and Leekam, 2008). One aim of this study was to pilot the
use of a novel task which corrects for these problems. While
watching the movie, an activity that children have likely done
many times before, we ask them to follow the story and
predict what happens next. Children do not need to reason
about a belief that is false, an inherent difficulty in false
belief tasks (Bloom and German, 2000). The differences in
our task relative to previous ToM tasks allow us to gain a
better understanding of how children think about more reallife social interactions. While children are not engaged in
the interaction themselves, a movie may allow greater immersion
into the social situation, giving us data that move us closer
to understanding children’s knowledge of social interactions
in the real world, while in the scanner. Additionally, our
control condition specifically isolates theory of mind processing
relative to general social information; in the ToM condition,
children are asked to predict what a character may do next,
following the video clip, whereas in the social information
(control) condition, children still attend to social information
by counting the number of people in the video clip. There
have been several previous theory of mind tasks that rely
on passive viewing or listening, of mental vs. physical states,
2
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in a movie (Richardson et al., 2018; Richardson and Saxe,
2019) or story (Saxe et al., 2009) paradigm. These tasks do
not have the cognitive demands of a false belief task. However,
these tasks are passive and do not prompt the child to engage
in mentalizing. In our task, participants are given specific
instructions prior to the video clip to pay attention to a
specific person and then are asked in the response to determine
what emotional behavior (e.g., cry) that character might do
next. Saxe (2006) describes the importance of language or
verbal communication in real-life social conditions, indicating
that ToM tasks that are most appropriate or best target the
processes individuals use in day-to-day life will involve reasoning
about third-person situations in which verbal communication
is the primary modality. By asking participants to reason
about a movie character’s mental state based on both verbal
and nonverbal communication between characters, the Movie
Mentalizing Task more accurately approximates how children
might use social cognition in day-to-day life. Furthermore,
films are beneficial to use with child participants in
neuroimaging studies because they keep participants focused,
entertained, and even limit movement within the MRI scanner
(Richardson et al., 2018). Thus, this task improves upon prior
ToM tasks and offers the field a new ToM task appropriate
for use in the scanner with children.
The current study has two primary objectives. First,
we investigated the neural networks involved in theory of mind
in children using a novel pediatric fMRI task. Second, we tested
the relationship between neural activation and behavioral
measures of social cognition and social functioning, to identify
brain-behavior relationships. We hypothesized that this new
task will tap into core regions in the affective ToM network.
In addition, given that previous research has demonstrated a
strong relationship between social cognition and social
functioning, we hypothesized that a relationship between neural
activity in ToM regions will relate to behavioral ToM performance
and social functioning. We anticipated that the same regions
that support theory of mind processing would support social
functioning as well.

for this study were approved by the Harvard University
Institutional Review Board, study 21305.

Behavioral Tasks

Participants completed measures for this study over the course
of two study visits. During the first session, child participants
completed a K-SADS and a Wechsler Intelligence Scale for
Children (WISC)/Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence
(WASI) in addition to two ToM tasks: the Hinting Task (Schenkel
et al., 2008) and the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task (RMET;
Baron-Cohen et al., 2001b). Parents or guardians completed
a parent report measure of their child’s social functioning using
the Social Skills Improvement System Rating Scales (SSIS;
Gresham and Elliott, 2008). During the second visit, child
participants completed a mock MRI scan in addition to three
practice trials of the Movie Mentalizing Task to ensure children’s
understanding of the task. Upon successful completion of these
trials, child participants were scanned while completing the
Movie Mentalizing Task. Parents or guardians did not complete
any additional tasks during the second session.

Hinting Task

The Hinting Task (Schenkel et al., 2008) consists of 10 short
scenarios describing a social interaction in which a character
uses subtle verbal and social cues to hint at something they
need from another character. Children are asked to infer the
meaning of the hint. If the child fails to accurately infer the
hint, they are asked a follow-up question, which provides an
additional clue. Children are given two points for a correct
answer on the first try, one point for a correct answer when
given the clue and no points if they fail to accurately infer
the hint. There are 10 questions for a total of 20 possible
points. The task was originally created for an older age group
and was modified for children by Schenkel et al. (2008) to
assess ToM in children and adolescents with bipolar disorder;
we used the modified version in this study.

Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task

Children completed the child and adolescent version of the
RMET (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001a). This task requires participants
to look at pictures of people’s faces and infer their emotional
states by the expression of their eyes. Children are presented
with 28 pictures with four possible choices for each picture;
the child receives one point for each correct response, for a
possible 28 total points. The RMET has been used with
individuals with autism spectrum disorder, schizophrenia,
personality disorders, and traumatic brain injury (Baron-Cohen
et al., 2001b; Bora et al., 2009; Fertuck et al., 2009).

MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants

Forty-three children ages 8–12 years old from the greater Boston
community were recruited to participate in this study. Exclusion
criteria included left-handedness, an IQ < 70, and a past or
present psychiatric disorder as assessed by the Kiddie Schedule
for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia (KSADS; Kaufman
et al., 2000). Sixteen children were excluded from the study
for excessive movement during the scan, defined as more than
20% of volumes being >2 mm from the previous image or
+/− 2.5 SD from the global mean intensity signal. Two children
were removed from the sample due to technical issues (e.g.,
scanner malfunction). The final sample included 25 participants.
We obtained consent from all guardians and assent from all
participants. For taking part in the study, the child participants
and parents were compensated with gift cards. The procedures
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

Social Skills Improvement System Rating Scale

The SSIS-RS (Gresham and Elliott, 2008) can be used with
multiple raters (child, parent, and teacher) to assess three major
domains of children’s development: social skills, problem
behaviors, and academic competence. In this study, we used
parent rated measures to assess social skills. This assessment
3
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is a measure of social functioning. The social skills domain
assesses the following aspects of children’s social development:
communication, cooperation, assertion, responsibility, empathy,
engagement, and self-control. The SSIS-RS has been developed
for use with children ages 3–18, with specific tests for 5- to12-year-old children and 13- to 18-year-old children. Parents
are asked to rate how true a statement is on a 4-point scale
of not true, a little true, a lot true, and very true; higher
scores reflect better social functioning.

the movie clip, the child is prompted with a 2-s screen depicting
that character of interest paired with a prompt stating, “What
would this person do next?” (theory of mind question). The
child then sees a response screen for 6 s with the options
“1 – Cry,” “2 – Say Yuck,’” “3 – Smile,” “4 – Yell,” and “5 –
Cover Eyes” (theory of mind response). Each response option
corresponds to one of the five buttons on the five-button box
in the child’s right hand. In this task, the ToM response
condition does not have an “incorrect” behavioral response.
For each scenario, the character could reasonably take several
emotional responses to the situation from which the child can
choose. This design better mirrors real-life experiences where
several possible outcomes could occur during a social interaction.
In the social information condition, the child sees the 5-s
prompt, “Count how many people you see” (social information
prompt). The child then sees a 10-s video clip during which
they count how many people they observe in the clip. Next,
the child is prompted with the question, “How many people
did you see?” (social information question), for 2 s, which is
followed by a 6-s response screen with the options “1 1-person,”
“2 2-people,” “3 3-people,” “4 4-people,” and “5 5-or more people.”
Important to the design of this study, each movie clip is
viewed twice – once as an experimental condition, theory of
mind, and once as a control condition, social information; the
clips are randomized. This design allows us to tightly control
the stimuli such that the main difference between the conditions
is what the child is being asked to do while watching the
clips and responding to the prompts. In each condition, the
child attends to the people in the movie clip and is then
asked to think about the people viewed by either predicting
behavior or counting people. Only in the experimental condition
is the child asked to infer subsequent behavioral or emotional

Theory of Mind Task: Movie Mentalizing Task

The Movie Mentalizing Task (Figure 1) is a novel ToM task
designed for use in the scanner. Specifically, this task asks
participants to mentalize – that is, to infer and reason about
mental states from human actions – and then use that inference
to predict subsequent behavior. The Movie Mentalizing Task
uses the 1994 film The Little Rascals and five of its main
characters to assess children’s brain function, as they watch
movie clips and make decisions about what a character would
do next (theory of mind condition) or how many people were
in a scene (social information condition).
For this task, each trial consists of a fixation cross (jittered
at 4, 6, and 8 s), a prompt screen, a movie clip, a second
prompt screen, and a response screen. The task was presented
using Matlab and Psychtoolbox. Each of the three runs was
comprised of six experimental trials and six control trials for
a total of 18 experimental trials and 18 control trials in the task.
In the experimental condition, the child sees a picture of
one of the movie characters accompanied by a 5-s prompt
stating, “Pay attention to this person.” The child then sees a
10-s video clip involving the character they just viewed. After

FIGURE 1 | Movie Mentalizing Task.

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org
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responses. Thus, our response screens – theory of mind response
and social information response – comprise our conditions of
interest by providing the clearest contrast of mentalizing relative
to general social information.

of 144 studies, Molenberghs et al. (2016) identified seven
key regions related to theory of mind processing; we created
regions of interest based on the seven weighted centers of
each cluster which included the following: left superior temporal
gyrus, right medial frontal gyrus, right superior temporal
gyrus, left precuneus, right IFG, left superior frontal gyrus,
and the left precentral gyrus. This method, a group rather
than individually defined method, allowed us to choose
functionally defined regions from the literature as our regions
of interest. Previous studies focused on social-cognitive
development have also used a group analysis approach to
identify theory of mind regions, which supports this particular
method (Richardson et al., 2018; Mukerji et al., 2019; Xiao
et al., 2019). Using the MarsBar tool with SPM8, an ROI
was defined as an 10 mm sphere around the peak coordinates
for each region. Using each ROI, a beta value was extracted
for each participant’s level of neural activity in each region
for the contrast ToM response > social information response.
We were interested in the relationships between neural activity
and the social variables (i.e., Hinting Task, RMET, and SSIS).
Specifically, we ran correlations between neural activity extracted
from each ROI and each of the social cognition and social
functioning tasks.

fMRI Acquisition Parameters

Participants were scanned on a 3-Tesla Siemens scanner at
the Center for Brain Science, Harvard University. Wholebrain coverage was achieved by using 40 slices with a
3 × 3 × 3 mm voxel size and a 0.5 mm gap. Changes in blood
oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) MR signal were
measured using a gradient echoplanar imaging (EPI) sequence
(TR = 2.56 s, TE = 30 ms, flip angle = 85°). Three time series
with 236 volumes were obtained for each subject. We used
prospective acquisition correction (PACE) on all functional
runs. PACE applies an adjustment to slice acquisitions (up
to 8° and 2 mm) during the functional scan in order to
correct for head movement throughout the scan. FMRI data
were processed using SPM 8 (Statistical Parametric Mapping
software; Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology,
London, United Kingdom) in Matlab 7.4. R2007A.
Preprocessing included slice timing, realignment to the mean
across all runs, co-registration of functional scans to the
structural image, normalization to MNI space, and smoothing
with an 8 mm Gaussian kernel. Data were high-pass filtered
at 128 s. The artifact detection toolbox (ART), http://www.
nitrc.org/projects/artifact_detect, was used to identify outliers
in movement (>2 mm from the previous image) and global
signal (+/− 2.5 SD from the global mean intensity signal)
for each participant. Participants with more than 20% of
volumes removed were excluded from analyses.

RESULTS
The final sample included 25 children (14 females, mean
age = 11.24 years, SD = 1.39 years, range 8–13 years). Though prior
work suggests that theory of mind changes throughout
development (Gweon et al., 2012), our age range and sample
size are too small to investigate developmental changes in this
study. All participants completed the WISC (Wechsler, 1991)
or WASI (Wechsler, 1999; M = 115.82, SD = 10.48, Range =
92–135).

Data Analysis

Statistical analysis was performed using the general linear
model approach in order to estimate the response parameters
for both ToM response and social information response.
Importantly, the question and the response screens for both
the theory of mind and social information conditions were
modeled together (labeled as response in Figure 1) to reflect
all neural activity involved in responding to the prompt in
both the theory of mind and social information conditions.
For each condition of interest (ToM and social information),
hemodynamic responses were modeled to the onset of the
prompt plus the response to the prompt for a total of 8 s
(Figure 1). Subjects’ estimates of movement outliers from
ART were entered as covariates of no interest. We created
the contrast ToM response > social information response at the
individual level. A one-sample t test was conducted to examine
differences between ToM response vs. the social information
response at the group level. In addition to whole-brain
comparisons, we also conducted region of interest (ROI)
analyses. Specifically, to test a priori hypotheses that neural
activity in ToM regions would be associated with social
cognition and social behavior, theory of mind ROIs were
defined from a 2016 neuroimaging meta-analysis (Molenberghs
et al., 2016) of theory of mind regions. From a meta-analysis
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

Behavioral Measures

On the Hinting Task, the children performed with an average
correct score of M = 18.9 (SD = 1.73, Range 13–20) out of 20.
On the Mind in the Eyes Task, children performed with an
average correct score of M = 21 (SD = 2.76, Range 14–28) out
of 28. Parent report of social skills fell within the average
range, M = 105.71 (SD = 15.53, Range 64–130). There were no
significant correlations among the behavioral assessments
(ps > 0.215).

Whole-Brain Analysis Theory of
Mind > Social Information

We conducted a one-sample t test of the ToM response > social
information response contrast. The whole-brain regression was
thresholded at p < 0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons at
voxel level with family-wise error with a minimum cluster
size of 20 voxels (k = 20; Table 1; Figure 2). We find significantly
greater neural activity in theory of mind-related regions for
the ToM relative to control condition including the left TPJ,
left and right superior temporal sulcus, and left IFG.
5
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TABLE 1 | Whole-brain analysis for ToM Response > Control Response p < 0.05 FWE, k = 20.
Brain region
Superior temporal sulcus
Insula
Inferior frontal gyrus
Superior temporal sulcus
Superior temporal sulcus
Superior parietal lobule
Precentral gyrus
Inferior frontal gyrus
Insula
Insula
Temporoparietal junction
Fusiform gyrus
Supplemental motor area

L/R

k

x

y

z

T

p at FWE (voxel level)

L
L
L
R
R
L
L
R
R
R
R
L
L

1,081

−51
−27
−42
48
51
−27
−45
57
33
33
66
−39
−6

2
29
17
−31
−19
−61
2
29
17
29
−46
−58
20

−20
−2
−8
−5
−8
46
46
16
−17
−5
16
−17
46

9.89
9.12
9.03
9.28
7.83
7.93
7.93
7.64
7.30
7.09
7.30
7.03
6.32

<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.003
0.004
0.003
0.005
0.019

115
69
55
141

41
56
20

research (Gweon et al., 2012; Richardson et al., 2018; Mukerji
et al., 2019) and support the use of the Movie Mentalizing
Task as an experiment that taps into the ToM network.
Further, this task addresses some of the concerns regarding
the use of false belief paradigms with children by providing
both verbal and nonverbal information for children to rely
upon to understand mental states. Additionally, this task
asks children to engage in mentalizing about a specific social
interaction they watched unfold, applying theory of mind
knowledge to understand a social situation; this aspect of
our task differs from other tasks that may lack dynamic
social interaction (e.g., Borbas et al., 2021). Moreover, as
an additional benefit, a movie task may be easier and more
engaging for children in the scanner (Jacoby et al., 2016;
Richardson et al., 2018).
Of note, we do not find neural activity in the MPFC in
our theory of mind relative to social information condition.
The MPFC is a region that has been consistently identified
as important in adult studies of theory of mind (Shallice,
2001; Molenberghs et al., 2016), but there are mixed findings
in children with the MPFC sometimes recruited for ToM
(O’Nions et al., 2014) and in other times not (Mukerji et al.,
2019). Some research has found age-related changes in
activation in the MPFC from childhood to adolescence,
whereas these changes were not noted in other ToM regions
like the superior temporal sulcus (Moriguchi et al., 2007).
It is possible that given the young age of our participants
the MPFC did not differentiate the social information in
the control condition relative to the specific ToM information
in the experimental condition. Perhaps greater specificity
would come with continued maturation. Alternatively, the
MPFC may have responded more broadly to people, rather
than to specific theory of mind information, thus having
a similar level of activity in both our theory of mind and
social information conditions. Previous research suggests
that the MPFC is associated with making judgments about
similar others (Mitchell et al., 2006) as well as attending
to the processing of socially relevant information that is
important to the individual (Krienen et al., 2010); these
findings support the idea that the MPFC may respond
similarly to our two conditions.

Neural Activity and Social Cognition and
Functioning Correlations

The ROIs identified in the Molenberghs et al. (2016) metaanalysis (Figure 3) were used to extract beta values for the
ToM > Social information response contrast for each
individual subject.
Correlations between neural activity in the seven ROIs and
three behavioral measures of social cognition and social
functioning were performed. Both the Hinting Task and the
RMET task failed to meet assumptions of normality, so Spearman
correlations were used. A Pearson correlation was used to test
the association between neural activity in the ROIs and the
SSIS (Table 2). At the statistical threshold of p < 0.05
(uncorrected), we observe a relationship between neural activity
in the right superior temporal gyrus and the Hinting Task
(r = 0.437, p = 0.037). Additionally, However, when applying a
Bonferroni correction for the number of tests (α = 0.002), neither
correlation remains significant after correction.we observe a
significant correlation between the neural activity in the right
IFG and the SSIS (r = 0.435, p = 0.049). We do not observe
any significant relationships between neural activity and the
RMET task (ps > 0.409).

DISCUSSION
In this study, we aimed to (1) identify the neural correlates
of theory of mind activity in children using a novel, more
ecological valid fMRI task and (2) test the relationship
between neural activity during a theory of mind task and
the behavioral correlates of social cognition and
social functioning.
First, we assessed the Movie Mentalizing Task’s ability
to engage the ToM network in children. As predicted,
we found that children ages 8–13 show increased activation
in the ToM network in response to thinking about mental
states vs. general social information. In a whole-brain analysis
of the ToM condition relative to the social information
condition, we find significantly greater neural activity in
classic ToM regions, including the right TPJ, superior temporal
sulcus, and the IFG. These findings are consistent with prior
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org
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FIGURE 2 | Whole-brain analysis theory of mind (ToM) Response > Social Information Response, p < 0.05 FWE, k = 20.

FIGURE 3 | Region of interest from meta-analysis of Molenbergh (2016).

between neural activity in our ROIs and social-cognitive
performance, we found a positive relationship between neural
activity in the right posterior superior temporal gyrus and
the Hinting Task. Additionally, we found a positive
relationship between neural activity in the right IFG and
parental report of social functioning, with greater activity
associated with better social functioning. The IFG is
consistently activated across ToM tasks (Shamay-Tsoory
et al., 2009; Dal Monte et al., 2014) and is often discussed
as part of the mirror or simulation system (Molenberghs,
2012). Additionally, the IFG is commonly associated with
affective, emotion understanding, relative to cognitive,
processing beliefs and thoughts, in ToM (Molenberghs et al.,
2016). Our finding is consistent with the idea that the IFG
is implicated in experiencing and inferring the feelings of
others, a skill that is critical to successful functioning. In
contrast to a false belief task, a cognitive ToM task, which
focuses on beliefs, the movie mentalizing task could
be considered an affective ToM task with a focus on emotion
inference. Previous research suggests important differentiation
in neural processes and behavioral functioning in affective
vs. cognitive theory of mind tasks (Sebastian et al., 2012),
and our study supports the importance of testing affective
theory of mind. The possible relationship between neural
activity and the parent-reported social skills demonstrates
a unique brain-behavior relationship. Different than an
association between neural activity and theory of mind

TABLE 2 | Correlations of regions of interest and social variables.

Left superior
temporal gyrus
Right medial frontal
gyrus
Right superior
temporal gyrus/
temporoparietal
junction
Left precuneus
Right inferior frontal
gyrus
Left superior frontal
gyrus
Left precentral gyrus

*

Hinting
task

Mind in the
eyes

SSIS – parent
report

0.28 (−0.122,
651)
−0.22 (−0.660,
0.241)
0.44* (0.035,
0.781)

−0.16 (−0.561,
0.227)
0.01 (−0.429,
0.522)
0.12 (−0.378,
0.541)

0.32 (−0.136, 657)

0.34 (−0.054,
0.648)
0.05 (−0.435,
0.466)
0.15 (−0.278,
0.521)
0.17 (−0.289,
0.569)

0.11 (−0.314,
0.546)
−0.05 (−0.430,
0.367)
−0.12 (−0.487,
0.275)
0.05 (−0.339,
0.430)

0.05 (−0.392,
0.470)
0.44* (0.002,
0.729)
0.37 (−0.072,
0.692)
0.40 (−0.037,
0.710)

0.08 (−0.360,
0.498)
0.26 (−0.189,
0.625)

p < 0.05, Table contains r values and 95% confidence intervals.

A second goal of this study was to test the relationship
between functional activity in ToM regions and behavioral
correlates of social cognition and social functioning.
We hypothesized that greater neural activity in ToM regions
would be related to better performance on social-cognitive
and social functioning tasks. Investigating the association
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org
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performance, this study shows that neural activity may
be linked to real-world behavior, which begins to give us
insight into how social functioning may be affected by
neurobiology. This research expands upon previous studies
that have also used movies as theory of mind stimuli (e.g.,
Richardson et al., 2018; Richardson and Saxe, 2019) because
we test this brain-behavior relationship. The brain-behavior
relationship we see between neural activity in ToM regions
and children’s real-world social functioning is consistent
with findings in adults. For example, in healthy adults,
greater activity in ToM regions is related to better daily
social functioning (Dodell-Feder et al., 2014). Our findings,
though nonsignificant after correcting for multiple
comparisons, suggest that this brain-behavior relationship
is similar in children and adults. This finding should
be replicated with larger samples. Our results help establish
the link among the social brain, social cognition, and social
functioning, which is a critical relationship to understand
its development in typically developing children and its
potential dysfunction in individuals with neurological and
psychiatric disorders (Kennedy and Adolphs, 2012).
Though we see a possible brain-behavior relationship with
specific ToM regions, we do not see it across all ToM regions
(e.g., left superior temporal gyrus) or across all tasks (e.g.,
RMET). There are several possibilities to explain these
findings. The Hinting Task is a relatively easy ToM task
for typically developing children, and most of our participants
performed extremely well, potentially a result of having
children with above-average IQs as the sample, with little
variation, suggesting a possible ceiling effect. Of note,
we found no relationship between neural activity in
ToM-related regions and the RMET. One potential reason
for this lack of relationship may be that the child version,
like the adult version of the RMET, might be more sensitive
to specific sociocultural factors like education, ethnicity, and
race, as much as social-cognitive ability (Dodell-Feder et al.,
2020). While these associations have not been tested in the
child version of the RMET, some of the same problems of
the adult version exist in the child version (e.g., difficult
vocabulary, ethnically homogenous stimuli). These potential
problems could explain why we find no relationship between
neural activity in ToM regions and performance on the
RMET. Moreover, these concerns regarding the RMET further
support the need for more valid tasks like the Movie
Mentalizing Task. Additionally, we do not see a relationship
across all ToM regions with social behavior; it is possible
that our measure of social behavior is too broad and focuses
more on global aspects of social functioning rather than
specific social behaviors.
This study is not without limitations. First, our brainbehavior correlations were not significant after controlling
for multiple comparisons; thus, the brain-behavior
relationships should be interpreted cautiously. Additionally,
while our task is not heavily reliant on language and
inhibitory control, we note that our theory of mind response
condition screen provides the participant with both a face
picture and emotion-related words, which by themselves
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

might tap in the theory of mind network, whereas the
social information response condition screen has no face
or emotion-related words. Thus, our task does not completely
control for all differences in the conditions. These limitations
may affect the generalizability of our study. In addition,
we do not see the expected relationship between the
behavioral measures of social cognition (e.g., Hinting Task
and RMET). It is possible that the ceiling effect on the
Hinting Task affected this relationship. Future studies should
include more complex theory of mind tasks (e.g., a faux
pas task) created for typically developing children. While
we attempted to pick a movie stimulus that many children
would not have seen given its original date (1994), it is
possible that some children may have previously viewed
this movie and that might have affected the results. Finally,
we did not take a post-test of children’s knowledge of the
vocabulary in the RMET, and thus, we do not know whether
variation in language ability might have affected the
outcome.
Further research is necessary to continue to elucidate
the nature of this brain-behavior relationship, as well as to
look at how it changes across the lifespan, as previous
research suggests that there are developmental changes in
these regions (Gweon et al., 2012). Future studies could
have a larger sample, investigate associations with other
demographic variables such as socioeconomic status, and
provide social functioning reports from the children and/
or their teachers. It is imperative that we identify the
mechanisms that help support real-world social functioning
if we want to better understand both typical and atypical social
development.
Theory of mind development is pivotal to children’s
social successes. Research has begun to map the neural
network of ToM throughout childhood into young adulthood.
This task contributes to that literature by using a novel
affective theory of mind task that robustly recruits the
social brain regions. This task potentially improves upon
previous tasks by having dynamic social stimuli and reducing
the burden of the cognitive complexities in other theory
of mind tasks (e.g., faux pas task). Additionally, whether
neural activity in these regions is related to social functioning
in children has rarely been tested, and this study fills that
gap in the literature. This work suggests a possible brainbehavior relationship, which can provide insight into the
development of social-cognitive processes like theory of
mind in typically and atypically developing children; this
insight could aid in intervention efforts with individuals
who have developmental delays or impairments in
these abilities.
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